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#### The affirmative’s hegemony impact is reminiscent of the Algonquian monster, the Wendigo – insatiable and bloodthirsty, its only purpose is endless destruction as it struggles to maintain itself – in a similar way, hegemony is a constant process of enemy-creation – a paranoid politics towards the impossible telos of world domination – this politics is responsible for 20th century atrocities as well as the exacerbation of modern geopolitical crisis

Cunningham 13 (Finian Cunningham, expert in international affairs specializing in the Middle East, former journalist expelled from Bahrain due to his revealing of human rights violations committed by the Western-backed regime, basically a badass, 3-11-13, “US Creates Nuclear Armed Cyber-attack Retaliation Force. Psychotic Superpower on a Hair Trigger,” <http://nsnbc.me/2013/03/11/us-creates-nuclear-armed-cyberattack-retaliation-force-psychotic-superpower-on-a-hair-trigger/>) gz

Since at least World War II, the genocidal propensity and practices of the US are proven, if not widely known, especially among its propagandized public. The atomic holocaust of hundreds of thousands of civilians at Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the beginning of the long shadow cast upon the world by this deranged superpower. For a few decades, the crazed American giant could hide behind the veil of the «Cold War» against the Soviet Union, pretending to be the protector of the «free world». If that was true, then why since the Cold War ended more than 20 years ago has there not been peace on earth? Why have conflicts proliferated to the point that there is now a permanent state of war in the world? Former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan have melded into countless other US-led wars across Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The «War on Terror» and its tacit invocation of «evil Islamists» have sought to replace the «Cold War» and its bogeymen, the «evil communists». But if we set aside these narratives, then the alternative makes compelling sense and accurate explanation of events. That alternative is simply this: that the US is an imperialist warmonger whose appetite for war, plunder and hegemony is insatiable. If the US had no official enemy, it would have to invent one. The Cold War narrative can be disabused easily by the simple contradictory fact, as already mentioned, that more than 22 years after the collapse of the «evil» Soviet Union the world is no less peaceful and perhaps even more racked by belligerence and conflict. The War on Terror narrative can likewise be dismissed by the fact that the «evil Islamists» supposedly being combated were created by US and British military intelligence along with Saudi money in Afghanistan during the 1980s and are currently being supported by the West to destabilize Libya and Syria and indirectly Mali. So what we are left to deduce is a world that is continually being set at war by the US and its various surrogates. As the executive power in the global capitalist system, the US is the main protagonist in pursuing the objectives of the financial-military-industrial complex. These objectives include: subjugation of all nations – their workers, governments and industries, for the total economic and political domination by the global network of finance capitalism. In this function, of course, the US government is aided by its Western allies and the NATO military apparatus. Any nation not completely toeing the imperialist line will be targeted for attack. They include Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba and North Korea. In the past, they included Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Grenada, Nicaragua, Chile and Panama. Presently, others include Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Mali undergoing attack operations. The difference between covert and overt attack by the US hegemon is only a matter of degrees. The decades-long economic sanctions on Iran, the cyber sabotage of that country’s industries and infrastructure, the assassination of nuclear scientists, deployment of terrorist proxies such as the MEK, and the repeated threat of all-out war by the US and its Israeli surrogate, could all qualify Iran as already being subjected to war and not just a future target. Likewise with Russia: the expansion of US missile systems around Russia’s borders is an act of incremental war. Likewise China: the American arming of Taiwan, relentless war gaming in the South China Sea and the stoking of territorial conflicts are all examples of where «politics is but war by other means». What history shows us is that the modern world has been turned into a lawless shooting gallery under the unhinged misrule of the United States of America. That has always been so since at least the Second World War, with more than 60 wars having been waged by Washington during that period, and countless millions killed. For decades this truth has been obscured by propaganda – the Cold War, War on Terror etc – but now the appalling stark reality is unavoidably clear. The US is at war – against the entire world.

#### This politics is maintained by a farce of legitimacy which justifies endless destruction

Gulli 13**.** Bruno Gulli, professor of history, philosophy, and political science at Kingsborough College in New York, “For the critique of sovereignty and violence,” <http://academia.edu/2527260/For_the_Critique_of_Sovereignty_and_Violence>, pg. 5

I think that we have now an understanding of what the situation is: **The sovereign everywhere**, be it the political or financial elite, **fakes the legitimacy** on which its power and authority supposedly rest. In truth, they **rest on violence and terror**, or the threat thereof. This is an **obvious and essential aspect** of the singularity of the present crisis. In this sense, the singularity of the crisis lies in the fact that the struggle for dominance is at one and the same time impaired and made more brutal by **the lack of hegemony**. This is true in general, but it is perhaps particularly true with respect to the greatest power on earth, **the United States**, whose hegemony has **diminished or vanished**. It is a fortiori true of whatever is called ‘the West,’ of which the US has for about a century represented the vanguard. Lacking hegemony, the **sheer drive for domination** has to show **its true face**, its **raw violence**. The usual, traditional **ideological justifications for dominance** (such as bringing democracy and freedom here and there) have now become **very weak** because of **the contempt** that the dominant nations (the US and its most powerful allies) **regularly show** toward legality, morality, and humanity. Of course, the so-called rogue states, thriving on corruption, do not fare any better in this sense, but for them, when they act autonomously and against the dictates of ‘the West,’ the specter of punishment, in the form of retaliatory war or even indictment from the International Criminal Court, remains a clear limit, a possibility. **Not so for the dominant nations**: who will stop the United States from striking anywhere at will, or Israel from regularly massacring people in the Gaza Strip, or envious France from once again trying its luck in Africa? Yet, though still dominant, these nations are painfully aware of their **structural, ontological and historical, weakness**. All attempts at concealing that weakness (and the uncomfortable awareness of it) **only heighten the brutality** in the exertion of **what remains of their dominance**. Although they rely on a **highly sophisticated military machine** (the technology of drones is a clear instance of this) and on an equally sophisticated diplomacy, which has **traditionally** been and **increasingly** is an outpost for **military operations and global policing** (now excellently **incarnated by Africom**), **they know that they have lost their hegemony**.

#### Their apocalyptic warming focus trades off with environmentalism – turns its own end

Crist, 7(Eileen Crist, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse”, http://journal.telospress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/2007/141/29.full.pdf+html)

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge ever 1964 work, an entire socio-cultural-economic life—from (actual or aspired to) ways of eating and lodging, transportation, entertainment, or emoting and thinking—“binds the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole.” Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1991), p. 12. Horkheimer and Adorno traced the origins of the collective’s participation in its own domination to the “historical” moment that magical control over nature (and over the deities of nature) was relinquished to a specific elite or clique in exchange for self and social preservation. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1972), pp. 21–22. After the decisive turn when the social body became implicated in its own domination, “what is done to all by the few, always occurs as the subjection of individuals by the many: social repression always exhibits the masks of repression by a collective” (ibid.). And elsewhere: “The misplaced love of the common people for the wrong which is done them is a greater force than the cunning of the authorities” (ibid., p. 134). In light of such astute observations offered by critical theorists, neo-Marxist and anarchist analyses that indict corporate and/or state power for the troubled natural and social worlds are, at best, only partially true. 20. More than thirty years ago, environmental philosopher Arne Naess articulated the influential distinction between “shallow” and “deep” ecology, characterized by the focus on symptoms of the environmental crisis, on the one hand, versus critical attention to underlying causes of problems, on the other. Notwithstanding its unfortunate elitist overtones—implying that some environmental thinkers are capable of reflecting deeply, while others flounder with superficialities—the shallow-deep distinction has been significant for two compelling reasons. One, it clarified how “symptomology” leads merely to technical piecemeal solutions; and two, it showed how underlying causes, left unaddressed, eventually generate more nasty symptoms. In other words, shallow ecological thinking is technical and narrow: when we think about climate change as “the problem”—as opposed to confronting the limitless expansionism of the capitalist enterprise as the problem—we arguably become shallow in our thinking. Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long- Range Ecology Movements,” in George Sessions, ed., Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1973; Boston: Shambhala, 1995), pp. 151–55. on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

#### Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats – also causes political apathy which turns case

Buell 3 (Frederick Buell, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books; “From Apocalypse To Way of Life,” pg. 185-186)

Looked at critically, then, **crisis discourse** thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a **political liability** almost as much as an asset. It calls up a **fierce and effective opposition** with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too **vulnerable to refutation by events**. It also **exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters** and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “**total solution**” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “**final solution**.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into **inhumanist authoritarianism**; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same timeit **depoliticizes people**, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, **people need to delink from nature** and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to **further indifference** to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “**total solution**.” **Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode; eco-authoritarianism** was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”

#### This securitizing logic manifests itself in a drive for certainty which causes endless violence

Burke, 7 (Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of New South Wales at Sydney, Anthony, Johns Hopkins University Press, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Project Muse)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied privilege to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it permeates being. This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror' Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

#### Vote neg to overdetermine the ontological by exposing the contradictions of imperial knowledge production – this dissident act fractures hegemonic thought

Spanos 8 (William Spanos, professor of English and comparative literature at Binghamton University, 2008, “American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam,” pp 27-30)

On the other hand, I do not want to suggest that the theoretical perspective¶ of Heidegger’s Abgeschiedene as such (or, for that matter, its¶ poststructuralist allotropes) is entirely adequate to this task of resistance¶ either, since the consequences of his (and, in a different way, of those he¶ influenced) failure to adequately think the political imperatives of his interrogation¶ of Western ontology are now painfully clear. We must,¶ rather, think the Abgeschiedene—the “ghostly” ontological exile evolving¶ a way of “errant” thinking that would be able to resist the global imperialism¶ of Occidental/technological logic—with, say, Said’s political¶ Deleuzian nomad: the displaced political emigré evolving, by way of his¶ or her refusal to be answerable to the “Truth” of the Occident, a politics¶ capable of resisting the polyvalent global neo-imperialism of Occidental¶ political power. The Abgeschiedene, the displaced thinker, and the migrant,¶ the displaced political person, are not incommensurable entities;¶ they are two indissolubly related, however uneven, manifestations of the¶ same world-historical event.¶ The “political Left” of the 1980s, which inaugurated the momentum¶ “against theory,” was entirely justified in accusing the “theoretical” discourse¶ of the 1970s of an ontological and/or textual focus that, in its obsessive¶ systematics, rendered it, in Said’s word, “unworldly”—indifferent¶ to the “imperial” politics of historically specific Western history. But it can¶ be seen now, in the wake of the representation of the global “triumph” of¶ liberal democratic capitalism in the 1990s as the end of history, or, at any¶ rate, of America’s arrogant will to impose capitalist-style democracy on different,¶ “destabilizing” cultures, that this Left’s focus on historically specific¶ politics betrays a disabling indifference to the polyvalent imperial politics¶ of ontological representation. It thus repeats in reverse the essential failure¶ of the theoretically oriented discourse it has displaced. This alleged praxisoriented¶ discourse, that is, tends—even as it unconsciously employs in its¶ critique the ontologically produced “white” metaphorics and rhetoric informing¶ the practices it opposes—to separate praxis from and to privilege¶ it over theory, the political over the ontological. Which is to say, it continues,¶ in tendency, to understand being in the arbitrary—and disabling—¶ disciplinary terms endemic to and demanded by the very panoptic classificatory¶ logic of modern technological thinking, the advanced metaphysical¶ logic that perfected, if it did not exactly enable, the colonial project¶ proper.35 In so doing, this praxis-oriented discourse fails to perceive that¶ being, however it is represented, constitutes a continuum, which, though¶ unevenly developed at any historically specific moment, nevertheless traverses¶ its indissolubly related “sites” from being as such and the epistemological¶ subject through the ecos, culture (including family, class, gender,¶ and race), to sociopolitics (including the nation and the international or¶ global sphere). As a necessary result, it fails to perceive the emancipatory¶ political potential inhering in the relay of “differences” released (decolonized)¶ by an interrogation of the dominant Western culture’s disciplinary¶ representation of being. By this relay of positively potential differences I do¶ not simply mean “the nothing” (das Nichts) or “the ontological difference”¶ (Heidegger), “existence” (Sartre), “the absolutely other” (Levinas), “the¶ differance” or “trace” (Derrida), “the differend” (Lyotard), the “invisible”¶ or “absent cause” (Althusser) that belong contradictorily to and haunt¶ “white”/totalitarian metaphysical thinking.36 I also mean “the pariah”¶ (Arendt), “the nomad” (Deleuze and Guattari), “the hybrid” or “the minus¶ in the origin” (Bhabha), “the nonbeings” (Dussel), the subaltern (Guha),¶ “the emigré” (Said), “the denizen” (Hammar), “the refugee” (Agamben),¶ “the queer” (Sedgwick, Butler, Warner), “the multitude” (Negri and¶ Hardt),37 and, to point to the otherwise unlikely affiliation of these international¶ post“colonial” thinkers with a certain strain of post“modern”¶ black American literature, “the darkness” (Morrison) that belong contradictorily¶ to and haunt “white”/imperial culture politics:¶ The images of impenetrable whiteness need contextualizing to¶ explain their extraordinary power, pattern, and consistency. Because¶ they appear almost always in conjunction with representations¶ of black or Africanist people who are dead, impotent, or¶ under complete control, these images of blinding whiteness seem¶ to function as both antidote for meditation on the shadow that is¶ the companion to this whiteness—a dark and abiding presence¶ that moves the hearts and texts of American literature with fear¶ and longing. This haunting, a darkness from which our early literature¶ seemed unable to extricate itself, suggests the complex¶ and contradictory situation in which American writers found¶ themselves during the formative years of the nation’s literature.38¶ In this chapter, I have overdetermined the ontological perspective of¶ the Abgeschiedene, the errant thinker in the interregnum who would think¶ the spectral “nothing” that a triumphant empirical science “wishes to¶ know nothing” about,39 not simply, however, for the sake of rethinking¶ the question of being as such, but also to instigate a rethinking of the uneven¶ relay of practical historical imperatives precipitated by the post-Cold¶ War occasion. My purpose, in other words, has been to make visible and¶ operational the substantial and increasingly complex practical role that¶ ontological representation has played and continues to play in the West’s¶ perennial global imperial project, a historical role rendered disablingly invisible¶ as a consequence of the oversight inherent in the vestigially disciplinary¶ problematics of the privileged oppositional praxis-oriented¶ discourses, including that of all too many New Americanists. In accordance¶ with this need to reintegrate theory and practice—the ontological¶ and the sociopolitical, thinking and doing—and to accommodate the present¶ uneven balance of this relationship to the actual conditions established¶ by the total colonization of thinking in the age of the world picture,¶ I would suggest, in a prologemenal way, the inordinate urgency of resuming¶ the virtually abandoned destructive genealogy of the truth discourse of¶ the post-Enlightenment Occident, now, however, reconstellated into the¶ post-Cold War conjuncture. I mean specifically, the conjuncture that, according¶ to Fukuyama (and the strategically less explicit Straussian neoconservatives¶ that have risen to power in America after 9/11), has borne¶ apocalyptic witness to the global triumph of liberal capitalist democracy¶ and the end of history. Such a reconstellated genealogy, as I have suggested,¶ will show that this “triumphant” post-Cold War American polity¶ constitutes the fulfillment (end) of the last (anthropological) phase of a¶ continuous, historically produced, three part ontological/cultural/sociopolitical¶ Western history: what Heidegger, to demarcate its historical itinerary¶ (Greco-Roman, Medieval/Protestant Christian, and Enlightenment¶ liberal humanist), has called the “ontotheological tradition.” It will also¶ show that this long and various history, which the neoconservatives would¶ obliterate, has been from its origins imperial in essence. I am referring¶ to the repeatedly reconstructed history inaugurated by the late or post-¶ Socratic Greeks or, far more decisively, by the Romans, when they reduced¶ the pre-Socratic truth as a-letheia (unconcealment) to veritas (the¶ adequation of mind and thing), when, that is, they reified (essentialized)¶ the tentative disclosures of a still originative Platonic and Aristotelian¶ thinking and harnessed them as finalized, derivative conceptional categories¶ to the ideological project of legitimizing, extending, and efficiently¶ administering the Roman Empire in the name of the Pax Romana.

#### Every affirmation is a decision and an affirmation of a particular interpretation of what it means to decide – neutralizing that moment before a decision is in of itself violent

**Dillon 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of international relations at the University of Lancaster, PhD in philosophy, April 1999, “Another Justice,” published in Political Theory Volume 27 Number 2, page 157-8)

I wish to argue, in addition, that the condition of being-in-between is exemplified by the 'inter' of another international relations. Especially in the proximity of the Refugee, for example, there is an explicit manifestation of the advent of the claim of Justice. The traditional intersubjectivity of international relations defaults, through the way in which the advent of the Refugee always calls to presence the stranger in the self itself, into the intra of a plural and divided self. The figure of the sovereign subject so integral to traditional international thought falsely poses the key questions of the self, of origination and of Justice. There can be no sovereign point of departure. The law is always born from a broken law, justice from the absence of Justice. There is always a co-presence of the other in the same; such that every self is a hybrid. The origin, if it is to issue forth in anything, therefore, must always already come divided and incomplete. The advent of Justice and the possibility of politics arise only because that plethos is ineradicable. There is then no sovereign subject. The self is a divided self from a beginning that is itself incomplete. It is only by virtue of that very division, that very incompleteness, that the question of justice arises at all. Thought of another Justice is therefore a continuous displacement of normal justice, a radical discomfort to it. But I have first to note how normal justice understands its place before considering the taking place of Justice differently. At its simplest the normal model of justice-sometimes known as the distributive model-notes that any society is governed by rules.9 Normal models differ, however, according to how they account for the derivation of those rules, what those rules define as just and unjust, and who or what is empowered by them to make, execute, and interpret the law. The most basic of these rules establish the status and entitlements of those who belong to the community. Correspondingly, these rules also specify who is a stranger, outsider, or alien, and they sometimes make provision for how the alien is to be dealt with should she or he appear at, or cross, the threshold of the community. This, in its crudest terms, is distributive justice. The laws, which it specifies, establish a regime of justice that expresses the ethical beliefs and commitments of that community. More than that, they inaugurate them. Each juridical decision is in some way, great or small, a communal rededication of those beliefs. The law, then, does not merely make a decision or enact a will. It reinaugurates a sense of what it is to have a will and make a decision in that community, as well as to what ends and purposes these may be devoted.10 Such law has to come from somewhere. An official narrative of one form or another supports how the community came to have the law which it does, together with the means and manner by which it is to be interpreted and exercised. That narrative explains both the origins of the law and the way in which it has been handed down. God and covenants, immemorial traditions and social contracts are amongst the most favoured of these. Divine inspiration, the dictates of reason, or a common sense are then said to furnish the law with the secure foundation it is thought to require. Injustice for the normal model, it further follows, is a function of sin, or the breakdown of reason, or the failure to attend to the dictates of common sense. One way or another, each of these ruptures tends to be blamed upon the irruption of irregular passions and desires which the law was inaugurated to limit and control as the means of determining and dispensing justice in the first place. Injustice for the normal model, in short, is the abnormal which effects a breach in the very paternity of the law itself. It is what the normal model claims to keep at bay as distributive justice orders the affairs of the community. All thought of justice and politics must, of course, pass through thought. How could it be otherwise? We think justice in the way that we do because of the various forms through which it is established and distributed. We also think justice in the way that we do because of the way that we think. The thought of another Justice is necessarily dependent therefore upon a way of thinking other than that which has historically come to govern our diverse onto-theological traditions of justice. That other way of thinking has continuously to be contrasted with the thought that underlies distributive justice, so that the characteristic features of another Justice may be differentiated from those of the normal model. Two of the key points of difference concern the interpretation of Time and the interpretation of the Human. Each of these derives from what I call the return of the ontological in continental thought.

### science diplomacy

#### **Status quo discussions between US and Cuban scientists solve**

Haven 4/11/13 (Paul, Associated Press Havana reporter, “Under the radar, Cuba and U.S. often work together,” The Associated Press Nation and World, http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci\_22997924/under-radar-cuba-and-u-s-often-work)

HAVANA — Cuba and the United States might be longtime enemies with a bucket overflowing with grievances, but the fast return of a Florida couple who fled U.S. authorities with their two kidnapped children in tow shows the Cold War enemies are capable of remarkable cooperation on many issues. Indeed, diplomats and observers on both sides of the Florida Straits say American and Cuban law enforcement officers, scientists, disaster relief workers, Coast Guard officials and other experts work together on a daily basis, and invariably express professional admiration for each other. "I don't think the story has been told, but there is a real warmth in just the sort of day-to-day relations between U.S. and Cuban government officials," said Dan Whittle, who frequently brings scientific groups to the island in his role as Cuba program director for the Environmental Defense Fund. "Nearly every time I talk to American officials, they say they were impressed by their Cuban counterparts. There really is a high level of mutual respect." Almost none of these technical-level interactions make the headlines, but examples are endless. Just last week, Cuba's top environmental official Ulises Fernandez and several island oil experts attended a conference in New York of the International Association of Drilling Contractors after the State Department expedited their visas. The American government maintains a Coast Guard representative in Cuba, and the two countries work together to interdict suspicious boats. A U.S. diplomat involved in the process said that security officials on both sides are on a first-name basis and that the Cubans happily accept FBI and Coast Guard baseball caps as gifts.

#### Alt-Cause - Funding barriers

Redden, 8

[Elizabeth, writer, July 16, 2008, “ Science Knows No Borders. But Funders Do.,” Inside Higher Ed., <http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/07/16/science>]

James A. Calvin, the interim vice president for research at Texas A&M University, referenced, by way of example, three different summits that brought together Chinese and U.S. scientists, each conference a site of vigorous discussion and debate. And then what? “Everyone’s excited, but then after three conferences we’re still at the same phase,” Calvin told the U.S. House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Research and Science Education during a hearing Tuesday on the role of non-governmental organizations and universities in international science and technology cooperation What scientists have, Calvin explained, are “the international conferences to make the introductions. What they don’t have is the mechanism to take the next step.” When pressed by the committee chairman, Rep. Brian Baird (D-Wash.), to offer an example of what such a mechanism would look like, Calvin suggested that, in this context, a granting entity jointly funded by the Chinese and U.S. governments could promote scholarly collaboration (he cautioned, however, that he wouldn’t want to dilute existing research funds available through the National Science Foundation). Calvin's suggestion got to the heart of two of the challenges to international scholarly cooperation highlighted during Tuesday’s hearing: the difficulty of coordinating research when partners have different governmental agencies to ask of and answer to, and, at least in the U.S. government’s case, the legal limitations on funding foreign collaborators. (“Although we do agree with the view that U.S. taxpayer funds should be used primarily to support American science, there are instances, such as in international science development activities, where we believe this limitation can impede the ability of the programs to achieve their goals,” said Alan I. Leshner, chief executive officer of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, which publishes Science.) Among the other barriers brought up were continuing challenges with visas, although, as Representative Baird pointed out, witnesses at a February subcommittee hearing reported progress on that front.

#### Science Diplomacy fails – can’t overwhelm political conflict

Dickson, 9

[David, Director, SciDev.Net, 4 June 2009, “ The limits of science diplomacy,” SciDev, <http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html>]

Recently, the Obama administration has given this field a new push, in its desire to pursue "soft diplomacy" in regions such as the Middle East. Scientific agreements have been at the forefront of the administration's activities in countries such as Iraq and Pakistan. But — as emerged from a meeting entitled New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy, held in London this week (1–2 June) — using science for diplomatic purposes is not as straightforward as it seems. Some scientific collaboration clearly demonstrates what countries can achieve by working together. For example, a new synchrotron under construction in Jordan is rapidly becoming a symbol of the potential for teamwork in the Middle East. But whether scientific cooperation can become a precursor for political collaboration is less evident. For example, despite hopes that the Middle East synchrotron would help bring peace to the region, several countries have been reluctant to support it until the Palestine problem is resolved. Indeed, one speaker at the London meeting (organised by the UK's Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science) even suggested that the changes scientific innovations bring inevitably lead to turbulence and upheaval. In such a context, viewing science as a driver for peace may be wishful thinking. Conflicting ethos Perhaps the most contentious area discussed at the meeting was how science diplomacy can frame developed countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in the developing world. There is little to quarrel with in collaborative efforts that are put forward with a genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership — whether between individuals, institutions or countries — is the new buzzword in the "science for development" community. But true partnership requires transparent relations between partners who are prepared to meet as equals. And that goes against diplomats' implicit role: to promote and defend their own countries' interests. John Beddington, the British government's chief scientific adviser, may have been a bit harsh when he told the meeting that a diplomat is someone who is "sent abroad to lie for his country". But he touched a raw nerve. Worlds apart yet co-dependent The truth is that science and politics make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need science to achieve their goals, whether social, economic or — unfortunately — military; scientists need political support to fund their research. But they also occupy different universes. Politics is, at root, about exercising power by one means or another. Science is — or should be — about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful purposes.

#### Adaptation solves the extinction impact to warming

NIPCC 11 Archived 8 March, Surviving the Unprecedented Climate Change of the IPCC, http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html

(Citing: Willis, K.J., Bennett, K.D., Bhagwat, S.A. and Birks, H.J.B. 2010. 4°C and beyond: what did this mean for biodiversity in the past? Systematics and Biodiversity 8: 3-9.)

In a paper published in Systematics and Biodiversity, Willis et al. (2010) consider the IPCC (2007) "predicted climatic changes for the next century" -- i.e., their contentions that "global temperatures will increase by 2-4°C and possibly beyond, sea levels will rise (~1 m ± 0.5 m), and atmospheric CO2 will increase by up to 1000 ppm" -- noting that it is "widely suggested that the magnitude and rate of these changes will result in many plants and animals going extinct," citing studies that suggest that "within the next century, over 35% of some biota will have gone extinct (Thomas et al., 2004; Solomon et al., 2007) and there will be extensive die-back of the tropical rainforest due to climate change (e.g. Huntingford et al., 2008)." On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos et al., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis et al. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate."

#### No methane impact

Archer, computational ocean chemist – University of Chicago, 3/6/’10

(David, “Arctic Methane on the Move?” <http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2010/03/arctic-methane-on-the-move/>)

For some background on methane hydrates we can refer you here. This weeks’ Science paper is by Shakhova et al, a follow on to a 2005 GRL paper. The observation in 2005 was elevated concentrations of methane in ocean waters on the Siberian shelf, presumably driven by outgassing from the sediments and driving excess methane to the atmosphere. The new paper adds observations of methane spikes in the air over the water, confirming the methane’s escape from the water column, instead of it being oxidized to CO2 in the water, for example. The new data enable the methane flux from this region to the atmosphere to be quantified, and they find that this region rivals the methane flux from the whole rest of the ocean. What’s missing from these studies themselves is evidence that the Siberian shelf degassing is new, a climate feedback, rather than simply nature-as-usual, driven by the retreat of submerged permafrost left over from the last ice age. However, other recent papers speak to this question. Westbrook et al 2009, published stunning sonar images of bubble plumes rising from sediments off Spitzbergen, Norway. The bubbles are rising from a line on the sea floor that corresponds to the boundary of methane hydrate stability, a boundary that would retreat in a warming water column. A modeling study by Reagan and Moridis 2009 supports the idea that the observed bubbles could be in response to observed warming of the water column driven by anthropogenic warming. Another recent paper, from Dlugokencky et al. 2009, describes an uptick in the methane concentration in the air in 2007, and tries to figure out where it’s coming from. The atmospheric methane concentration rose from the preanthropogenic until about the year 1993, at which point it rather abruptly plateaued. Methane is a transient gas in the atmosphere, so it ought to plateau if the emission flux is steady, but the shape of the concentration curve suggested some sudden decrease in the emission rate, stemming from the collapse of economic activity in the former Soviet bloc, or by drying of wetlands, or any of several other proposed and unresolved explanations. (Maybe the legislature in South Dakota should pass a law that methane is driven by astrology!) A previous uptick in the methane concentration in 1998 could be explained in terms of the effect of el Nino on wetlands, but the uptick in 2007 is not so simple to explain. The concentration held steady in 2008, meaning at least that interannual variability is important in the methane cycle, and making it hard to say if the long-term average emission rate is rising in a way that would be consistent with a new carbon feedback. Anyway, so far it is at most a very small feedback. The Siberian Margin might rival the whole rest of the world ocean as a methane source, but the ocean source overall is much smaller than the land source. Most of the methane in the atmosphere comes from wetlands, natural and artificial associated with rice agriculture. The ocean is small potatoes, and there is enough uncertainty in the methane budget to accommodate adjustments in the sources without too much overturning of apple carts. Could this be the first modest sprout of what will grow into a huge carbon feedback in the future? It is possible, but two things should be kept in mind. One is that there’s no reason to fixate on methane in particular. Methane is a transient gas in the atmosphere, while CO2 essentially accumulates in the atmosphere / ocean carbon cycle, so in the end the climate forcing from the accumulating CO2 that methane oxidizes into may be as important as the transient concentration of methane itself. The other thing to remember is that there’s no reason to fixate on methane hydrates in particular, as opposed to the carbon stored in peats in Arctic permafrosts for example. Peats take time to degrade but hydrate also takes time to melt, limited by heat transport. They don’t generally explode instantaneously.For methane to be a game-changer in the future of Earth’s climate, it would have to degas to the atmosphere catastrophically, on a time scale that is faster than the decadal lifetime of methane in the air. So far no one has seen or proposed a mechanism to make that happen.

### cooperation

#### No risk of a spill – safety coop now, emergency authority and there is so little recoverable oil there won’t be much drilling

Cardenas, 12 – former senior official at the U.S. State Department (Jose, “The phony Cuba embargo debate”, Foreign Policy, March 21, 2012, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/21/the\_phony\_cuba\_embargo\_debate)//eek

In recent weeks, an unholy alliance of political activists and economic opportunists have been trying to convince anyone who will listen that the U.S. embargo of Cuba is inviting "catastrophic" damage to Florida by preventing the U.S. from responding to a potential oil spill from a newly launched Cuban rig just outside U.S. waters. The claim is without merit. The impetus for this contrived argument is that in late January, the Spanish oil company Repsol began exploratory drilling in Cuban waters -- 80 nautical miles from the Florida Keys -- using a Chinese-made rig owned by an Italian company. The fact is, under current U.S. policy, any U.S. President has broad authorities to ensure all U.S. resources and expertise can be deployed in case of a disaster off the southeastern U.S. coast. And all indications are the administration has moved expeditiously -- with lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico -- to plan a U.S. response -- with no changes needed in U.S. law. Yet, that has not stopped the doomsday scenarios. For example, according to one alarmist analysis, in case of an accident: "The Coast Guard would be barred from deploying highly experienced manpower, specially designed booms, skimming equipment and vessels, and dispersants. U.S. offshore gas and oil companies would also be barred from using well-capping stacks, remotely operated submersibles, and other vital technologies." The arguments, frankly, are a hash of half-truths and erroneous and contradictory statements about the U.S. embargo. For example, we are told the U.S. embargo prevents interaction between the U.S. and Cuban officials to discuss response scenarios, only to learn that they already are interacting. Meetings between U.S. and Cuban officials (and those from Bahamas, Jamaica, and Mexico) have already taken place under the auspices of the U.N. International Maritime Organization. Then there is the ludicrous scenario posited of vintage Cuban crop dusters being forced into action because the embargo allegedly would prevent U.S. aircraft from dropping oil dispersants. Nonsense. In addition, there is the de rigueur clumsy caricature of pro-embargo Cuban Americans, who "might protest any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in Cuban territory." This seems not to be aware that most Cuban Americans live in South Florida and would have a decided interest in any despoiling of the state's environment. They would hardly be averse to any U.S. mobilization to counter a spill. What they do justifiably object to is any exploitation of the situation for political ends. Indeed, a particularly egregious example of the politicization of the issue has been the involvement of the Environmental Defense Fund, which has been positively sanguine about Cuban oil drilling. A powerful lobby able to mobilize hundreds of activists to oppose U.S. offshore drilling, they have been leading advocates of across-the-board U.S. cooperation with Cuba on offshore oil drilling, despite the latter's woeful inexperience and dearth of capabilities in offshore oil drilling. In this, they have been aided and abetted by assorted U.S. oil services companies who have been misrepresenting U.S. policy in a misguided attempt to create economic opportunity. In the end, the likelihood that Cuba possesses any commercially viable oil reserves off its shores is dubious. And, in the unlikely event that it does discover any, it's probable that they will be exploitable only after the Castro regime passes into the dustbin of history. In the meantime, however, allowing Cuba anywhere near a deepwater platform is akin to handing a hand-grenade to a monkey. The Obama administration could have done better by strong-arming foreign companies from partnering with the Castro brothers on this project. But they appear to have a handle on cleaning up any attendant mess -- without any superfluous changes to U.S. policy towards the Castro dictatorship.

**Environmental alarmism is unfounded and not a justification for taking action**

**Kaleita, 7** – PHD, Assistant Professor Agricultural and Biosystems Engineering (Amy, “Hysteria’s History”Environmental Alarmism in Context”, <http://www.pacificresearch.org/docLib/20070920_Hysteria_History.pdf>)

Apocalyptic stories about the irreparable, catastrophic damage that humans are doing to the natural environment have been around for a long time. These hysterics often have some basis in reality, but are blown up to illogical and ridiculous proportions. Part of the reason they’re so appealing is that they have the ring of plausibility along with the intrigue of a horror flick. In many cases, the alarmists identify a legitimate issue, take the possible consequences to an extreme, and advocate action on the basis of these extreme projections. In 1972, the editor of the journal *Nature* pointed out the problem with the typical alarmist approach: “[Alarmists’] most common error is to suppose that the worst will always happen.”82 But of course, if the worst always happened, the human race would have died out long ago. When alarmism has a basis in reality, the challenge becomes to take appropriate action based on that reality, not on the hysteria. The aftermath of *Silent Spring* offers examples of both sorts of policy reactions: a reasoned response to a legitimate problem and a knee-jerk response to the hysteria. On the positive side, *Silent Spring* brought an end to the general belief that all synthetic chemicals in use for purposes ranging from insect control to household cleaning were uniformly wonderful, and it ushered in an age of increased caution on their appropriate use. In the second chapter of her famous book, Carson wrote, “It is not my contention that chemical insecticides must never be used. I do contend that… we have allowed these chemicals to be used with little or no advance investigation of their effect on soil, water, wildlife, and man himself.” Indeed, Carson seemed to advocate reasoned response to rigorous scientific investigation, and in fact this did become the modern approach to environmental chemical licensure and monitoring. An hour-long CBS documentary on pesticides was aired during the height of the furor over *Silent Spring*. In the documentary, Dr. Page Nicholson, a water-pollution expert with the Public Health Service, wasn’t able to answer how long pesticides persist in water once they enter it, or the extent to which pesticides contaminate groundwater supplies. Today, this sort of information is gathered through routine testing of chemicals for use in the environment. 20 V: Lessons from the Apocalypse Ironically, rigorous investigation was not used in the decision to ban DDT, primarily due to the hysteria *Silent Spring* generated. In this example, the hysteria took on a life of its own, even trumping the author’s original intent. There was, as we have seen, a more sinister and tragic response to the hysteria generated by *Silent Spring*. Certain developing countries, under significant pressure from the United States, abandoned the use of DDT. This decision resulted in millions of deaths from malaria and other insect-borne diseases. In the absence of pressure to abandon the use of DDT, these lives would have been spared. It would certainly have been possible to design policies requiring caution and safe practices in the use of supplemental chemicals in the environment, without pronouncing a death sentence on millions of people. A major challenge in developing appropriate responses to legitimate problems is that alarmism catches people’s attention and draws them in. Alarmism is given more weight than it deserves, as policy makers attempt to appease their constituency and the media. It polarizes the debaters into groups of “believers” and “skeptics,” so that reasoned, fact-based compromise is difficult to achieve. Neither of these aspects of alarmism is healthy for the development of appropriate policy. Further, alarmist responses to valid problems risk foreclosing potentially useful responses based on ingenuity and progress. There are many examples from the energy sector where, in the presence of economic, efficiency, or societal demands, the marketplace has responded by developing better alternatives. That is not to say that we should blissfully squander our energy resources; on the contrary, we should be careful to utilize them wisely. But energy-resource hysteria should not lead us to circumvent scientific advancement by cherry-picking and favoring one particular replacement technology at the expense of other promising technologies. Environmental alarmism should be taken for what it is—a natural tendency of some portion of the public to latch onto the worst, and most unlikely, potential outcome. Alarmism should not be used as the basis for policy. Where a real problem exists, solutions should be based on reality, not hysteria.

**Erosion inevitable – natural and artificial alt causes**

Maine Bureau of Land and Water Quality 2K(<http://www.state.me.us/dep/blwq/doceducation/dirt.htm>)

Soil erosion is the #1 source of pollution to surface water in Maine. Each year rainstorms and snowmelt wash tons of dirt off the land around Maine. How could something so ‘natural’ be so bad? Soil erosion is natural after all. However, when we change the landscape from forest to yards, streets, farm fields, shopping centers and roads, we accelerate soil erosion. In the USA, soil is eroding at about *seventeen times* the rate at which it forms. Erosion results in:  (1) higher project costs, (2) damage to aquatic habitat, (3) reduced water quality, (4) elimination of trout and salmon fisheries, (5) lower shorefront property values, (6) higher property taxes, and (6) loss of business and jobs.  Soil is a valuable resource on the land, but when washed into streams, lakes, and estuaries it is Maine's biggest water quality problem.

**Tons of alt causes to ocean biod**

**Kunich 6** – Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law (John, Killing Our Oceans, p 122-3, AG)

It is crucial, albeit perhaps counterintuitive, that we pay close attention to land-based activities even as we focus on marine hotspots. There are enormous threats to marine biodiversity that originate, not in the oceans, but on dry land in the coastal zones of the world. Part of the reason these threats are prevalent is that an estimated 67 percent of the entire global human population lives either on the coast or within 37 miles of the coast, and that percentage is increasing.14 These huge and growing populations often cause overutilization of fishing and other resources in coastal areas, habitat destruction and degradation, pollution (both organic and inorganic), eutrophication and related issues such as pathogenic bacteria and algal toxins, introduction of invasive species, watershed alteration, marine littering, and other harms to the nearby marine regions.15 Given that so many key marine centers of biodiversity reside in the near-coast coral reefs and continental shelf areas, it is of tremendous importance that our legal approach embrace appropriate controls over these land-based threats. Any plan that shortsightedly and narrowly focuses too much on ocean-based activities will, paradoxically, miss the boat.

The affirmative’s discourse of disease securitizes the alien body of the infected – justifies ethnic cleansing in pursuit of the “perfect human”

Gomel 2000(Elana Gomel, English department head at Tel Aviv University, Winter 2000, published in Twentieth Century Literature Volume 46, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0403/is_4_46/ai_75141042>)

In the secular apocalyptic visions that have proliferated wildly in the last 200 years, the world has been destroyed by nuclear wars, alien invasions, climatic changes, social upheavals, meteor strikes, and technological shutdowns. These baroque scenarios are shaped by the eroticism of disaster. The apocalyptic desire that finds satisfaction in elaborating fictions of the End is double-edged. On the one hand, its ultimate object is some version of the crystalline New Jerusalem, an image of purity so absolute that it denies the organic messiness of life. [1] On the other hand, apocalyptic fictions typically linger on pain and suffering. The end result of apocalyptic purification often seems of less importance than the narrative pleasure derived from the bizarre and opulent tribulations of the bodies being burnt by fire and brimstone, tormented by scorpion stings, trodden like grapes in the winepress. In this interplay between the incorporeal purity of the ends and the violent corporeality of the means the apocalyptic body is born. It is a body whose mortal sickness is a precondition of ultimate health, whose grotesque and excessive sexuality issues in angelic sexlessness, and whose torture underpins a painless--and lifeless--millennium.The apocalyptic body is perverse, points out Tina Pippin, unstable and mutating from maleness to femaleness and back again, purified by the sadomasochistic "bloodletting on the cross," trembling in abject terror while awaiting an unearthly consummation (122). But most of all it is a suffering body, a text written in the script of stigmata, scars, wounds, and sores. Any apocalypse strikes the body politic like a disease, progressing from the first symptoms of a large-scale disaster through the crisis of the tribulation to the recovery of the millennium. But of all the Four Horsemen, the one whose ride begins most intimately, in the private travails of individual flesh, and ends in the devastation of the entire community, is the last one, Pestilence. The contagious body is the most characteristic modality of apocalyptic corporeality. At the same time, I will argue, it contains a counterapocalyptic potential, resisting the dangerous lure of Endism, the ideologically potent combination of "apocalyptic terror", a nd "millennial perfection" (Quinby 2). This essay, a brief sketch of the poetics and politics of the contagious body, does not attempt a comprehensive overview of the historical development of the trope of pestilence. Nor does it limit itself to a particular disease, along the lines of Susan Sontag's classic delineation of the poetics of TB and many subsequent attempts to develop a poetics of AIDS. Rather, my focus is on the general narrativity of contagion and on the way the plague-stricken body is manipulated within the overall plot of apocalyptic millennialism, which is a powerful ideological current in twentieth-century political history, embracing such diverse manifestations as religious fundamentalism, Nazism, and other forms of "radical desperation" (Quinby 4--5). Thus, I consider both real and imaginary diseases, focusing on the narrative construction of the contagious body rather than on the precise epidemiology of the contagion. All apocalyptic and millenarian ideologies ultimately converge on the utopian transformation of the body (and the body politic) through suffering. But pestilence offers a uniquely ambivalent modality of corporeal apocalypse. On the one hand, it may be appropriated to the standard plot of apocalyptic purification as a singularly atrocious technique of separating the damned from the saved. Thus, the plague becomes a metaphor for genocide, functioning as such both in Mein Kampf and in Camus's The Plague.[2] On the other hand, the experience of a pandemic undermines the giddy hopefulness of Endism. Since everybody is a potential victim, the line between the pure and the impure can never be drawn with any precision. Instead of delivering the climactic moment of the Last Judgment, pestilence lingers on, generating a limbo of common suffering in which a tenuous and moribund but all-embracing body politic springs into being. The end is indefinitely postponed and the disease becomes a metaphor for the process of livi ng. The finality of mortality clashes with the duration of morbidity. Pestilence is poised on the cusp between divine punishment and manmade disaster. On the one hand, unlike nuclear war or ecological catastrophe, pandemic has a venerable historical pedigree that leads back from current bestsellers such as Pierre Quellette's The Third Pandemic (1996) to the medieval horrors of the Black Death and indeed to the Book of Revelation itself. On the other hand, disease is one of the central tropes of biopolitics, shaping much of the twentieth-century discourse of power, domination, and the body. Contemporary plague narratives, including the burgeoning discourse of AIDS, are caught between two contrary textual impulses: acquiescence in a (super) natural judgment and political activism. Their impossible combination produces a clash of two distinct plot modalities. In his contemporary incarnations the Fourth Horseman vacillates between the voluptuous entropy of indiscriminate killing and the genocidal energy directed at specific categories of victims. As Richard Dellamora points out in his gloss on Derrida, apocalypse in general may be used "in order to validate violence done to others" while it may also function as a modality of total resistance to the existing order (3). But my concern here is not so much with the difference between "good" and "bad" apocalypses (is total extinction "better" than selective genocide?) as with the interplay of eschatology and politics in the construction of the apocalyptic body.

### no war

The aff’s perception of war as an isolatable event that **makes it impossible to deal with the pervasive effects of everyday militarism**

cuomo 96 – PhD, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati (Chris, Hypatia Fall 1996. Vol. 11, Issue 3, pg 30)

In "Gender and `Postmodern' War," Robin Schott introduces some of the ways in which war is currently best seen not as an event but as a presence (Schott 1995). Schott argues that postmodern understandings of persons, states, and politics, as well as the high-tech nature of much contemporary warfare and the preponderance of civil and nationalist wars, render an eventbased conception of war inadequate, especially insofar as gender is taken into account. In this essay, I will expand upon her argument by showing that accounts of war that only focus on events are impoverished in a number of ways, and therefore feminist consideration of the political, ethical, and ontological dimensions of war and the possibilities for resistance demand a much more complicated approach. I take Schott's characterization of war as presence as a point of departure, though I am not committed to the idea that the constancy of militarism, the fact of its omnipresence in human experience, and the paucity of an event-based account of war are exclusive to contemporary postmodern or postcolonial circumstances.(1) Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Moving away from crisis-driven politics and ontologies concerning war and military violence also enables consideration of relationships among seemingly disparate phenomena, and therefore can shape more nuanced theoretical and practical forms of resistance. For example, investigating the ways in which war is part of a presence allows consideration of the relationships among the events of war and the following: how militarism is a foundational trope in the social and political imagination; how the pervasive presence and symbolism of soldiers/warriors/patriots shape meanings of gender; the ways in which threats of state-sponsored violence are a sometimes invisible/sometimes bold agent of racism, nationalism, and corporate interests; the fact that vast numbers of communities, cities, and nations are currently in the midst of excruciatingly violent circumstances. It also provides a lens for considering the relationships among the various kinds of violence that get labeled "war." Given current American obsessions with nationalism, guns, and militias, and growing hunger for the death penalty, prisons, and a more powerful police state, one cannot underestimate the need for philosophical and political attention to connections among phenomena like the "war on drugs," the "war on crime," and other state-funded militaristic campaigns. I propose that the constancy of militarism and its effects on social reality be reintroduced as a crucial locus of contemporary feminist attentions, and that feminists emphasize how wars are eruptions and manifestations of omnipresent militarism that is a product and tool of multiply oppressive, corporate, technocratic states.(2) Feminists should be particularly interested in making this shift because it better allows consideration of the effects of war and militarism on women, subjugated peoples, and environments. While giving attention to the constancy of militarism in contemporary life we need not neglect the importance of addressing the specific qualities of direct, large-scale, declared military conflicts. But the dramatic nature of declared, large-scale conflicts should not obfuscate the ways in which military violence pervades most societies in increasingly technologically sophisticated ways and the significance of military institutions and everyday practices in shaping reality. Philosophical discussions that focus only on the ethics of declaring and fighting wars miss these connections, and also miss the ways in which even declared military conflicts are often experienced as omnipresent horrors. These approaches also leave unquestioned tendencies to suspend or distort moral judgement in the face of what appears to be the inevitability of war and militarism.

## 2NC

**framework**

**situated position underpins political efficacy**

**Dillon 99** (Michael Dillon, professor of politics at the University of Lancaster, 1999, “Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics,” pp 97-8)

Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other regional modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.

**4) ceding imagination to the state effaces agency and unlocks atrocity – choose to confront your role in violence**

**Kappeler 95** (Susanne, The Will to Violence, pgs 9-11)

War does not suddenly break out in a peaceful society; sexual violence is not the disturbance of otherwise equal gender relations. Racist attacks do not shoot like lightning out of a non-racist sky, and the sexual exploitation of children is no solitary problem in a world otherwise just to children. The violence of our most commonsense everyday thinking, and especially our personal will to violence, constitute the conceptual preparation , the ideological armament and the intellectual mobilization which make the 'outbreak' of war, of sexual violence , of racist attacks, of murder and destruction possible at all. 'We are the war,' writes Slavenka Drakulic at the end of her existential analysis of the question, 'what is war?': I do not know what war is, I want to tell my friend, but I see it everywhere . It is in the blood-soaked street in Sarajevo, after 20 people have been killed while they queued for bread. But it is also in your non-comprehension, in my unconscious cruelty towards you. in the fact that you have a yellow form [for refugees] and I don't, in the way in which it grows inside ourselves and changes our feelings, relationships, values - in short: us. We are the war. , , And I am afraid that we cannot hold anyone else responsible. We make this war possible , we permit it to happen. 'We are the war' - and we also are' the sexual violence , the racist violence , the exploitation and the will to violence in all its manifestations in a society in so-called 'peacetime", for we make them possible and we permit them to happen. 'We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society - which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of 'collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equivalent of a universal acquittal. 6 On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective 'assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility - leading to the well- known illusion of our apparent 'powerlessness' and its accompanying phenomenon - our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations - have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia \_ since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us in to thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgment, and thus into underrating the responsibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls 'organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually organized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major power mongers. For we tend to think that we cannot 'do ' anything , say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of 'What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as 'virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN - finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like ‘I want to stop this war', 'I want military intervention ', 'I want to stop this backlash', or 'I want a moral revolution. '? 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our 'non- comprehension' : our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we 'are' the war in our 'unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the 'fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don 't' - our readiness, in other words, to build identities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the 'others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape 'our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

**5) knowledge production is uniquely influential for ir**

**Calkivik 10** (Emine Asli Calkivik, PhD in political science from the University of Minnesota, October 2010, “Dismantling Security,” http://purl.umn.edu/99479) gz

In contrast to traditional approaches to security, which assume an objective¶ world that operates according to ahistorical formal models and rely on a statist¶ political ontology that naturalizes the meaning of what security is and how it can be¶ achieved,120 critical approaches attend to the relations of power that structure the¶ production of in/securities and expose the processes by which national identities and¶ what are deemed as a danger to those identities are constructed. A common point¶ shared by these engagements is their emphasis on the ethical dimension of scholarly¶ inquiry as well as the recognition that knowledge claims are always embedded in¶ relations of power. Their emphasis on the “ought” rather than the “is” reflects less a¶ reworking of the hierarchy between material and ideational power than an emphasis¶ on the social nature of global politics and an understanding that all phenomenon¶ pertaining to international relations exists through the cultural and ideological¶ structures through which they are given meaning and legitimated.121¶ Definition and construction of threats and the way in which states respond to¶ those threats constitutes one of the primary items on the agenda of critical scholars.122¶ While conventional analyses of security conceive threats as arising from material¶ capabilities of sovereign states located in a self-help system, critical approaches point¶ to the ways in which threats and intentions are not objectively given but socially¶ constructed: they involve history, culture, and power relations that cannot be reduced¶ to an objective measure of military capabilities. They investigate the ways in which¶ systems of signification and normative structures constrain or regulate collective¶ security practices or transform conduct in war. All of these studies reveal the¶ historically situated dynamics underlying practices that shape the desire to secure¶ bodies, nations, and states.¶ Primary examples of these engagements come from scholars working under¶ the broad banner of Constructivism.123 These scholars take as their premise the¶ proposition that interests and actions of states are socially constructed and therefore¶ subject to change. While leaving intact the traditional assumptions about military and¶ state-centric understandings of security, some of these studies nevertheless challenge¶ the traditional frameworks by explaining security practices through a recourse to¶ ideational elements such as norms and identities rather than relying on material¶ factors.124 In particular, these works challenge Neorealist and Neoliberal approaches,¶ which assume that states are rational, self-help actors in an anarchic environment. For¶ instance, Alexander Wendt in his seminal study shows how different (Hobbesian or¶ Kantian) anarchical cultures can play a role in channeling the security practices of¶ states on different paths.125 Focusing on international norms, such as the prohibitions¶ against the use of chemical and nuclear weapons or norms of humanitarian¶ intervention, other scholars argue that questions about international security cannot be¶ answered by Realist materialist explanations alone.126 An example to these¶ investigations is provided by Risse-Kappen, who argues that NATO’s post-Cold War¶ survival can only be explained with reference to ideational factors such as values and¶ identity—in this case, democratic, liberal values—that guarantee the institution’s¶ survival in the absence of a distinct threat.127¶ The post-Cold War security environment and proliferating threat discourses in¶ the absence of the “Soviet enemy” provide ample resource for scholars who focus on¶ the representational practices that played role in the construction of threats to state¶ security. For instance, Mutimer examines in detail the linguistic and metaphorical¶ construction of threats to the United States and its allies through the “image of¶ proliferation.”128 He points out the way in which a particular discursive framing of a¶ problem—in this case, the construction of the use of chemical or biological weapons¶ as a problem of proliferation as opposed to a problem of disarmament—shapes the¶ constitution of identities and interests of the actors in question and gives way to¶ particular patterns of foreign policy.¶ The discourse of threats and their social production—as well as the¶ construction of the objects of security as an inextricable aspect of security¶ discourses—constitutes an important item on the agenda of critical investigations.129¶ In conventional analyses, the purported state of nature populated by instrumentally¶ rational actors is taken as the departure point of analysis. Within this framework, the¶ state acts as the primary source of authority, the guarantor of order, and the primary¶ protector of the values and interests of these individuals. While the state is rendered¶ the locus of security, security of the state gets equated to the security of the citizen. In¶ contrast to the positing of the state as the locus of security with a neutrally given¶ interest of survival, critical scholars argue that a concept like national security needs to¶ be understood as a social construction rather than an objectively given fact. For¶ instance, in her case study of the Cuban missile crisis, Jutta Weldes shows how a core¶ concept such as the national interest is discursively constituted through¶ representational practices and linguistic elements.130 Other investigations explore the¶ working of security as a political practice, or the processes of construction of threats¶ through institutional mobilization and knowledge production. Some of these scholars¶ use “speech-act theory” to study how utterances of security constitute certain issues as¶ security problems.131¶ A related line of analysis, conducted mostly from post-structural and postcolonial¶ perspectives, is to trace the operation of power in its various guises and to¶ map the hierarchical relations, highlighting the gaps and silences of hegemonic¶ security narratives. In his Writing Security, David Campbell investigates how certain¶ risks are interpreted as dangers, what power effects these interpretative articulations¶ produce, and how they police the boundaries of the political community and produce¶ obedient subjects.132 Going against the grain of state-centric, strategic accounts of war,¶ scholars such as Michael Shapiro bring to focus the role of political violence in the¶ construction of the geopolitical imaginary and the production/ affirmation of collective¶ identity.133 Others focus on the international interventions that took place during the¶ 1990s and discuss the ways in which these imperial investments are legitimated by the¶ West through a moral discourse based on universal values.134¶ Other studies lay bare the historical biases, Eurocentric assumptions, and¶ racialized or gendered content of conceptions, analyses, theories, and practices of¶ security. Attending to the power of representation, they expose the links between¶ economies of power and “truth” in the re/production of international hierarchies and¶ in/securities. Problematizing the representation of post-colonial states as “failed” or¶ lacking, and hence as a major threat to international security, some of these scholars¶ demonstrate how these so-called failures were precisely the products of unequal¶ encounters with Western colonialism, pointing out the ways in which these¶ hierarchical relations were being reproduced through ongoing unequal economic,¶ social, and military relations.135 They analyze the construction of the non-Western¶ subject as the inferior other—“the Southern” or “the Oriental”—and attend to the¶ ways in which these representations are mobilized to legitimate certain security¶ practices and policies such as nuclear proliferation in the Third World.136 Introducing¶ feminist perspectives into their analyses, other scholars expose the gender biases¶ imbued in security practices, problematizing state security for rendering violence and¶ insecurity from the perspective of women.137

**t/enviro**

**their politics is guilt assuaging which ignores personal complicity in environmental crisis**

**Bobertz, 95** (Bradley, Nebraska Law, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 711)

A routine pattern in environmental lawmaking is a tendency to blame environmental problems on easily identifiable objects or entities rather than on the social and economic practices that actually produce them. [n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n17) Once identified as the culprit of an environmental problem, this blame-holder comes to symbolize and embody the problem itself. Lawmaking then begins to resemble a re-enactment of a scapegoat ritual, in which the community's misfortunes are symbolically transferred to an entity that is then banished or slain in order to cleanse the community of its collective wrongdoing and remove the source of its adversity. The topic of scapegoating is commonly encountered in studies of racism, n18 family psychology, [n19](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n19) and mass sociology, n20 but is not often associated with law and legal scholarship. Nevertheless, parallels appear to exist between the general scapegoat phenomenon and environmental lawmaking.The term "scapegoat" derives from the guilt offerings ceremony set forth in the biblical book of Leviticus. According to the Levitical  [\*717]  scapegoat ceremony, Aaron placed both hands on the head of a live goat and confessed the sins of the people of Israel. [n21](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n21) Having thereby transferred the collective guilt of the people to the goat, he drove the goat into the desert "to carry off their iniquities to an isolated region." n22 This ceremony was to be repeated each year on the Day of Atonement. Other sacrifice rituals, including the "sin offering for the community" [n23](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n23) and the "guilt offerings," n24 were to be performed on a periodic basis. Essentially identical, [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n25) these other ceremonies involve the slaying of a young bull as a means for forgiving inadvertent transgressions of the people. n26Other cultures also employ similar sacrifice rituals to expunge evils brought about by the collective misconduct of the community. Beginning with James Frazer's The Golden Bough, [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n27) anthropologists have catalogued a remarkable variety of sacrifice rituals intended to expel collective sin. n28 Despite subtle variations in form and emphasis, these ceremonies follow a remarkably similar pattern: the participants view the ritual as a necessary measure for expelling collective wrongdoing, often after some misfortune or calamity has befallen the community. [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n29) Often, both the transference of the community's sins to the scapegoat object and the sacrifice of the object itself are performed by persons having special standing in the community, typically of a religious character. n30 [\*718]  While we might view these sacrifice rituals as acts of merely symbolic import, the participants themselves clearly believe the ceremonies accomplish their desired ends. The people of Southern Africa do not place the blood of their sick people on the head of a goat (which is then banished to the veldt) to engage the curiosity of European anthropologists. They simply intend to make sick people well. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n31) Likewise, the people put to death in Salem were killed because they were thought (proven!) to be witches, not because they were personifications of some other social anxiety. n32 To the detached observer, the bizarre and gruesome aspects of the ceremonies may stand out, but the participants do what they do because they believe it will work. [n33](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n33)This Article is not intended to support the notion that the targets of environmental regulation, in one way or another, are "scapegoats" in the common understanding of the term -- deserving of pity and freedom from compliance with environmental laws. Instead, I intend to shed light on a simple but troubling pattern: Environmental legislation is more likely to emerge from the lawmaking process when the problem it seeks to control is readily symbolized by an identifiable object, entity, or person -- a "scapegoat" in the sense discussed above. In the absence of such a scapegoat, however, lawmakers are less likely to take action. This pattern is particularly problematic because the identified scapegoat often bears an incomplete or distorted relationship to the actual problem at hand, resulting in laws that are likewise incomplete or distorted. As discussed below in Part V, because we deal harshly with culturally accepted symbols of environmental problems, it is less likely that we will deal with the problems (and their causes) themselves. For anyone concerned about the correlation between social problems and the legal regimes we create to solve them, this phenomenon should be cause for concern.

### A2: Kurasawa

Kurasawa goes neg—he concedes alarmism destroys predictions and collapses into manufactured technostrategic discourse

Kurasawa 4 Professor of Sociology @ York Universty of Toronto, Constellations, 11.4

Foremost among the **possible distortions** of farsightedness is **alarmism**, the manufacturing of unwarranted and unfounded **doomsday scenarios**. State and market institutions may seek to **produce a culture of fear** by deliberately stretching interpretations of reality beyond the limits of the plausible so as to exaggerate the prospects of impending catastrophes, or yet again, by intentionally promoting certain prognoses over others for instrumental purposes. Accordingly, regressive dystopias can operate as Trojan horses advancing political agendas or commercial interests that would otherwise be susceptible to public scrutiny and opposition. Instances of this kind of manipulation of the dystopian imaginary are plentiful: the invasion of Iraq in the name of fighting terrorism and an imminent threat of use of ‘weapons of mass destruction’; the severe curtailing of American civil liberties amidst fears of a collapse of ‘homeland security’; the neoliberal dismantling of the welfare state as the only remedy for an ideologically constructed fiscal crisis; the conservative expansion of policing and incarceration due to supposedly spiraling crime waves; and so forth. Alarmism constructs and codes the future in particular ways, producing or reinforcing certain crisis narratives, belief structures, and rhetorical conventions. As much as **alarmist ideas beget a culture of fear**, the reverse is no less true.

**2NC Heg**

**Benign hegemony = violence**

SAMIR **AMIN** director of the African office (in Dakar, Senegal) of the Third World Forum, an international nongovernmental association for research and debate, and chair of the World Forum for Alternatives. He is the author of numerous books and articles including Beyond U.S. Hegemony 25 FEB **2003** (“The Alternative to the neoliberal system of globalization and militarism Imperialism Today and the Hegemonic Offensive of the United States.”)

28. The hegemonic strategy of the United States is articulated on the collective character of new imperialism and to the profit of the insufficiencies and weaknesses of the “antineoliberal” social and political movements. 29. This strategy, barely recognized by the “proAmerican” defenders, is, in the dominant discourse, the object of two “soft” propositions, not quite real, but operational, from the point of view of our opponent. The first is that this hegemony belongs to a “gentle” leadership, sometimes knows as “benign hegemony” by the democratic fraction of the American establishment. Through this mix of false naivety and real hypocrisy, this discourse pretends that the United States only acts in the interests of the peoples who are associated with the triad, motivated by the same “democratic” pulses, and even the interests of the rest of the world, to whom globalization offers the chance of “development”, reinforced by the benefits of democracy that American powers promote everywhere, as we know. The second is that, in all domains, the Unites States benefit from enormous advantages  whether it be economic, scientific, political, military or cultural that legitimize their hegemony.

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In fact, American hegemony works from logic, and a system, that has little to do with the discourse it envelops. 30. The objectives of this hegemony have been proclaimed, and adhered to in innumerable productions from the US leaders (unfortunately, little read by its victims). After the fall of the USSR  their only potential military adversary  the US establishment evaluates that it has a period of about 20 years to put into place its global hegemony and reduce to nothingness the possibilities of its potential “rivals”, not that they are necessarily capable of an alternative hegemony, just capable of affirming their autonomy in a global system that would be “nonhegemonic”  in my language, a multicentric system. These “rivals” are of course Europe (we no longer hear talks about a Japan hegemony !), but also Russia and most of all China, the principal designated adversary that Washington may have to envision destroying (militarily) if she continues to persist in her “development” and a certain independent will. Other rivals have also been noted, in fact, all Southern countries that may develop a resistance to the exigencies of globalized neoliberalism  India or Brazil, Iran or South Africa. 31. The objectives are therefore to vassalize the allies in the triad, to make them incapable of effective global initiatives, and to destroy the “large countries”, always by nature too “big” (the United States being the only one with right to be so). Dismantle Russia after the USSR, dismantle China, India, even Brazil; instrumentalising the weaknesses of each country’s power systems, manipulate the former States of the USSR, and stroke the centrifugal forces in the Russian Federation, support the Muslims of Xinjiang and the Tibetan monks, feeding the conflict with the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, intervening in the Amazon (Plan Colombia), etc.

### perm

**The permutation is a teleological knee jerk which blocks out critique**

**Burke 7** (Anthony, lecturer at Adelaide University School of History and Politics, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

## 1NR

### Authoritarianism

**Environmental apocalypticism results in eco-authoritarianism – that’s Buell – people run to find scapegoats for environmental problems and populations are mobilized against entities that are perceived to be dangerous to the global order – it also creates a permanent state of exception as the sovereign holds in its hands the power over all life – this ensures mass atrocity**

**Agamben 98** – professor of philosophy at university of Verona (Giorgio, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 139-140)

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction—to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the exceprio of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

**Furthermore, political scapegoating ensures targeting of the third world**

**Gilbert 12**

Emily Gilbert, Canadian Studies and Geography University of Toronto, 2012, "The Militarization of Climate Change," ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 11 (1), 1-14 7

First, the military’s interest in climate change resurrects a narrow concept of security. Although the 2010 QDR recognizes impending concerns associated with human security (eg migration, disease and food security), it models the anticipated conflict through a traditional state-to-state war scenario, refracted through a neo- Malthusian conflict over resources (Dalby, 2009; Homer-Dixon, 1999). Resource conflict and other climate change impacts are mapped onto already vulnerable places in Sub Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia (Broder, 2009; CNA, 2007; Podesta and Ogden, 2007-08; Werz and Manlove, 2009), where, it is argued, they will act as ‘threat multipliers’ that will escalate into ‘failed state’ scenarios. This perpetuates a model whereby the enemy to the nation is elsewhere, and that ‘environmental threats are something that foreigners do to Americans or to American territory,’ not as a result of domestic policies (Eckersley 2009: 87). In this vein, the CIA has established a Center on Climate Change and National Security to collect foreign ‘intelligence’ on the national security impact of environmental change in other parts of the world.6

The bifurcation of domestic security and external threat reinforces a fiction of territorial and nationalist integrity, and works against thinking about climate change **as a global problem with a need for global responsibility and global solutions** (Dalby 2009: 50; Deudney 1999: 189).7 Moreover, the model of external threats coheres easily with the competitive frame that has been established between China and the US, as they vie not only for economic ascendency and resource- acquisition, but also for energy security and environmental policies and initiatives.8 In this vein, Thomas Freidman has proposed a militant green nationalism, something along the lines of a triumphalist Green New Deal that will recapture US global hegemony (Friedman, 2009).9 Achieving this result requires, however, more political agreement across US Democrats and Republicans, and it is precisely here that reframing climate change as a military issue seems to be an effective strategy for cross-partisan agreement.10 But what are the costs when militarization becomes necessary to legitimize climate change action?

The upshot is that the military is also legitimized, to the detriment of formal and informal politics. In a secretive and hierarchical military framework there is limited scope for public participation or legislative debate (UNEP 2007: 403). Militaries are about the ‘maintenance of elite power’ (Barnett 2001: 25). Issues regarding social justice are disregarded in favour of national objectives, while the vulnerabilities institutionalized through climate change are perpetuated (Barnett, 2006). This is particularly apparent vis-à-vis environmental refugees, which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates will swell to 150 million by 2050 (Reuveny, 2007). Militarism encourages the use of force against foreigners, with barriers erected to exclude those who bear the immediate impact of climate change, even though they are usually the least responsible for climate change. As Paul Smith notes, Operation Seal Signal, which the US deployed in 1994 to deal with 50,000 refugees from Haiti and Cuba, offers an instructive example of how the military addresses refugees, most of whom were held at Guantanamo Bay while their cases were processed (Smith, 2007). The responses to human tragedy in Haiti and Hurricane Katrina, when military priorities took hold over the immediate needs of the racialized, impoverished victims, speaks to the dangers of concocting security threats so that abandonment is prioritized over assistance (Giroux, 2006; Hallward, 2010). This is part of a worrisome trend of the rise of an ‘aid-military complex’ and military ‘encroachment’ on civilian-sponsored development (Hartmann 2010: 240).

### Util

Utilitarian problem solving justifies mass atrocity and turns its own end

Weizman 11 (Eyal Weizman, professor of visual and spatial cultures at Goldsmiths, University of London, 2011, “The Least of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence from Arendt to Gaza,” pp 8-10)

The theological origins of the lesser evil argument cast a long shadow on the present. In fact the idiom has become so deeply ingrained, and is invoked in such a staggeringly diverse set of contexts – from individual situational ethics and international relations, to attempts to govern the economics of violence in the context of the ‘war on terror’ and the efforts of human rights and humanitarian activists to manoeuvre through the paradoxes of aid – that it seems to have altogether taken the place previously reserved for the ‘good’. Moreover, the very evocation of the ‘good’ seems to everywhere invoke the utopian tragedies of modernity, in which evil seemed lurking in a horrible manichaeistic inversion. If no hope is offered in the future, all that remains is to insure ourselves against the risks that it poses, to moderate and lessen the collateral effects of necessary acts, and tend to those who have suffered as a result. In relation to the ‘war on terror,’ the terms of the lesser evil were most clearly and prominently articulated by former human rights scholar and leader of Canada’s Liberal Party Michael Ignatieff. In his book *The Lesser Evil*, Ignatieff suggested that in ‘balancing liberty against security’ liberal states establish mechanisms to regulate the breach of some human rights and legal norms, and allow their security services to engage in forms of extrajudicial violence – which he saw as lesser evils – in order to fend off or minimize potential greater evils, such as terror attacks on civilians of western states.11 If governments need to violate rights in a terrorist emergency, this should be done, he thought, only as an exception and according to a process of adversarial scrutiny. ‘Exceptions’, Ignatieff states, ‘do not destroy the rule but save it, provided that they are temporary, publicly justified, and deployed as a last resort.’12 The lesser evil emerges here as a pragmatist compromise, a ‘tolerated sin’ that functions as the very justification for the notion of exception. State violence in this model takes part in a necro-economy in which various types of destructive measure are weighed in a utilitarian fashion, not only in relation to the damage they produce, but to the harm they purportedly prevent and even in relation to the more brutal measures they may help restrain. In this logic, the problem of contemporary state violence resembles indeed an all-too-human version of the mathematical minimum problem of the divine calculations previously mentioned, one tasked with determining the smallest level of violence necessary to avert the greater harm. For the architects of contemporary war this balance is trapped between two poles: keeping violence at a low enough level to limit civilian suffering, and at a level high enough to bring a decisive end to the war and bring peace.13 More recent works by legal scholars and legal advisers to states and militaries have sought to extend the inherent elasticity of the system of legal exception proposed by Ignatieff into ways of rewriting the laws of armed conflict themselves.14 Lesser evil arguments are now used to defend anything from targeted assassinations and mercy killings, house demolitions, deportation, torture,15 to the use of (sometimes) non-lethal chemical weapons, the use of human shields, and even ‘the intentional targeting of some civilians if it could save more innocent lives than they cost.’16 In one of its more macabre moments it was suggested that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima might also be tolerated under the defence of the lesser evil. Faced with a humanitarian A-bomb, one might wonder what, in fact, might come under the definition of a greater evil. Perhaps it is time for the differential accounting of the lesser evil to replace the mechanical bureaucracy of the ‘banality of evil’ as the idiom to describe the most extreme manifestations of violence. Indeed, it is through this use of the lesser evil that societies that see themselves as democratic can maintain regimes of occupation and neo-colonization. Beyond state agents, those practitioners of lesser evils, as this book claims, must also include the members of independent nongovernmental organizations that make up the ecology of contemporary war and crisis zones. The lesser evil is the argument of the humanitarian agent that seeks military permission to provide medicines and aid in places where it is in fact the duty of the occupying military power to do so, thus saving the military limited resources. The lesser evil is often the justification of the military officer who attempts to administer life (and death) in an ‘enlightened’ manner; it is sometimes, too, the brief of the security contractor who introduces new and more efficient weapons and spatio-technological means of domination, and advertises them as ‘humanitarian technology’. In these cases the logic of the lesser evil opens up a thick political field of participation belonging together otherwise opposing fields of action, to the extent that it might obscure the fundamental moral differences between these various groups. But, even according to the terms of an economy of losses and gains, the conception of the lesser evil risks becoming counterproductive: less brutal measures are also those that may be more easily naturalized, accepted and tolerated – and hence more frequently used, with the result that a greater evil may be reached cumulatively, Such observations amongst other paradoxes are unpacked in one of the most powerful challenges to ideas such as Ignatieff’s – Adi Ophir’s philosophical essay *The Order of Evils*. In this book Ophir developed an ethical system that is similarly not grounded in a search for the ‘good’ but the systemic logic of an economy of violence – the possibility of a lesser means and the risk of more damage – but insists that questions of violence are forever unpredictable and will always escape the capacity to calculate them. Inherent in Ophir’s insistence on the necessity of calculating is, he posits, the impossibility of doing so. The demand of his ethics are grounded in this impossibility.17

### Science Diplomacy

**Science Diplomacy fails**

**Dickson 9** – Director of Science Development online (David, “The limits of science diplomacy”, http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html)

**Using science for diplomatic purposes has obvious attractions and several benefits. But there are limits to what it can achieve.** The scientific community has a deserved reputation for its international perspective — scientists often ignore national boundaries and interests when it comes to exchanging ideas or collaborating on global problems. So it is not surprising that science attracts the interest of politicians keen to open channels of communication with other states. Signing agreements on scientific and technological cooperation is often the first step for countries wanting to forge closer working relationships. More significantly, scientists have formed key links behind-the-scenes when more overt dialogue has been impossible. At the height of the Cold War, for example, scientific organisations provided a conduit for discussing nuclear weapons control. **Only so much science can do** Recently, the Obama administration has given this field a new push, in its desire to pursue "soft diplomacy" in regions such as the Middle East. Scientific agreements have been at the forefront of the administration's activities in countries such as Iraq and Pakistan. But — as emerged from a meeting entitled New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy, held in London this week (1–2 June) — **using science for diplomatic purposes is not as straightforward as it seems.** Some scientific collaboration clearly demonstrates what countries can achieve by working together. For example, a new synchrotron under construction in Jordan is rapidly becoming a symbol of the potential for teamwork in the Middle East. But whether scientific cooperation can become a precursor for political collaboration is less evident. For example, despite hopes that the Middle East synchrotron would help bring peace to the region, several countries have been reluctant to support it until the Palestine problem is resolved. Indeed, one speaker at the London meeting (organised by the UK's Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science) even suggested **that the changes scientific innovations bring inevitably lead to turbulence and upheaval**. In such a context, viewing science as a driver for peace may be wishful thinking. **Conflicting ethos** Perhaps the most contentious area discussed at the meeting was how science diplomacy can frame developed countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in the developing world. There is little to quarrel with in collaborative efforts that are put forward with a genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership — whether between individuals, institutions or countries — is the new buzzword in the "science for development" community. But true partnership requires transparent relations between partners who are prepared to meet as equals. And that goes against diplomats' implicit role: to promote and defend their own countries' interests. John Beddington, the British government's chief scientific adviser, may have been a bit harsh when he told the meeting that a diplomat is someone who is "sent abroad to lie for his country". But he touched a raw nerve. **Worlds apart yet co-dependent** The truth is that science and politics make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need science to achieve their goals, whether social, economic or — unfortunately — military; scientists need political support to fund their research. But they also occupy different universes. Politics is, at root, about exercising power by one means or another. Science is — or should be — about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful purposes. A strategy for promoting science diplomacy that respects these differences deserves support. Particularly so if it focuses on ways to leverage political and financial backing for science's more humanitarian goals, such as tackling climate change or reducing world poverty. **But a commitment to science diplomacy that ignores the differences — acting for example as if science can substitute politics** (or perhaps more worryingly, vice versa**), is dangerous**. The Obama administration's commitment to "soft power" is already faltering. It faces challenges ranging from North Korea's nuclear weapons test to domestic opposition to limits on oil consumption. **A taste of reality may be no bad thing.**

**Their emphasis on rationalist Western science greases the wheels of cultural imperialism**

**Hamm 5**, - (Bernd, Professor of Sociology, Jean Monnet Professor of European Studies, UNESCO Chair in Europe in a Global Perspective at the University of Trier, Germany, “Cynical Science: Science and Truth as Cultural Imperialism,” cut from Cultural Imperialism: Essays on the Political Economy of Cultural Domination, google books)//A-Berg

This chapter argues that our Western concepts of science and truth are used to legitimate interests aimed at the suppression and exploitation of nature and humans. They are used to mask the destructive character of Western political-economic interests. In doing this, science and truth have become ideologies. As such, they tend to benefit the “Power Elites” (C.W. Mills 1956)’ of society and, of course, the scientific community, at the cost of the population at large. The forced global imposition of this under standing of science and truth is part of cultural imperialism. This thesis is formulated in negative terms. It criticizes Western science but will not propose alternatives. Theodor W. Adorno, one of the leading figures of the Frankfurt School of sociology, has coined the term “negative dialectics” and argued that a critical analysis of existing reality implicitly contains its antithesis. This is not the place to go deeper into the issue of other knowledge systems (for a discussion of this see, e.g., Goonatilake ij8). My intention is not to follow up on Johan GaIning’s (1971) understanding of scientific imperialism (as a subtype of cultural imperialism), which still holds the assumption that science is a serious attempt to find out “the truth” (the imperialism in it being, rather, that valid objective science exists but is misused in the interest of power), but rather to challenge this assumption. Science has become in the course of history, or always was, so closely associated with, and subservient to the interests of, the power cadres that the idealistic idea of science appears as a major instrument to safeguard access to and influence on these cadres; in other words, it is a professional ideology The chapter will explore this thesis, first, by recapitulating the Western definition of science and truth as objective and value-free. It then moves on to some observations which do not comply with this self-image: the relation between science, money, and power; science and the problem of sustainable development; the Americanization of science; and university reform as experienced In Germany as part of the Bologna Process. These observations contrasted with the ideology will lead to a diagnosis of cynical science. Finally the globalization of such cynicism will be discussed. The Ideology of Science and Truth “Knowledge” may be defined as the way in which humans categorize, encode process, and impute meaning to their experiences. This is as true of scientific as of non-scientific forms of knowledge (Studley 1998:1). There are many different ways to acquire knowledge: through logical reasoning; sensual perception; intuition; authority and conformism; or devotion and love. An experience made according to certain rules commonly accepted in the community of scientists is called “scientific.” Irrelevant as this code might be for the majority of ordinary people, it has still succeeded in gaining strategic influence among cadres. Knowledge is acquired and processed in the context of world views, of systems of knowledge, and of cultures which people share and regularly confirm to each other. It is built into existing frames of reference, evaluated, and selected; meaning is attached to it and tied into the historical experience of a given society. It is neither autonomous nor objective but rather bound into those social conditions under which people live and is influenced by the social position of an individual in his or her society and the respective material living conditions. The sociology of knowledge (beginning with Karl Mannheim, 1893-1947) has provided ample evidence for this (see, however, the critical review of Mannheim’s approach by Adorno 1955), and many empirical studies have explored the images of society held by different social strata and professional groups. Such paradigms, which are relatively resistant to change, also exist in science, as Thomas Kuhn (1962) has argued. In everyday life, we accept a statement as “true” if it is confirmed by the rules of everyday experience, if it seems reasonable, if it is held true by people we love and respect, or ¡fit is confirmed by secondary information. A statement is taken to be “scientifically true” if it has been published in a highly reputable volume and is taken for granted by respected scientists, or 1f It has been tested according to the mies of scientific methodology. Karl Popper’s insistence that the truth of a statement can never be objectively confirmed in scientific rigour and that the scientific method demands that well-established hypotheses be falsified, thus gradually narrowing the field of potential truth, Is of only theoretical value (Popper 1960). It does not count very much In real practical research because new hypotheses are being continuously generated and tested in the hope of verification, while sets of well-established hypotheses being falsified is the exception. In extra-scientific everyday life, sensual experience, the opinion of a reference group, but mostly the mass media are relevant proofs of truth. In most of the sciences the empirical proof of truth is made by statistical tests based on probability theory, while quoting from the Bible or from a classical author has lost its persuasiveness. Mathematics is seen as an objective basis for rational argument. Empirical phenomena are supposed to be translated into the language of numbers to become scientifically accessible by mathematical transformation. Truth can be calculated, according to common belief in the scientific community The methods of scientific discovery are conventional; they rest on culturally specific consensus. However, we also have to assume that there are different ways towards achieving knowledge, which might well lead to differ ent results. Scientific education and training transfer such conventions. Therefore, it is important to understand who is entitled to determine the existence of such conventions, and on which criteria. Despite the obvious need for such careful reflection, the current common practice is that European (and other) social scientists tend to accept those statistical and methodological procedures which are the fashion of the day in the US as the standard for the relevance of our own work. The way into “refereed journals” seems to be more often paved with sophisticated statistics than with theoretically relevant arguments. How often do we find heavy statistical artillery used to shoot at theoretical mice! According to its self-image, science has to be independent and valuefree, leaving the scientist devoid of all external restrictions. There is only one goal, i.e., pure, purposeless knowledge. No political, economic, or other non-scientific interest should intrude into and divert the scientific process. Only then is it guaranteed that science will come continuously closer to the truth. Curiosity is not only part of the inner nature of humans but also serves the benefit of humankind at large. The scientist has one and only one task: to engage in pure research and make his or her knowledge available to others. He or she bears no responsibility beyond this. This is why the nationstate maintains universities and guarantees the freedom of research and teaching (sometimes, like in Germany, even in the constitution). National governments are well advised to invest in science because, at least in the long run, science will lead to wisdom and betterment, but also to competitive advantages, and thus to innovation, growth, employment, and income. Globalization increases the validity and the relevance of this argument. It is true, there are problems. Education, science, innovation, and growth are believed to be the means to solve them. According to this logic, many problems have their cause in the fact that people are not scientifically educated, that they act in their traditional, “irrational” ways. Scientific progress is seen as the solution for all our problems: diseases will be eradicated or healed, environmental damages prevented or repaired, poverty and hunger overcome, non-renewable resources substituted, crime and drug abuse prevented, life-time extended and eternal youth achieved, development enforced and material welfare secured for all. Scientific progress is the panacea for all deficits. The idea of a reality that opens itself to scientifically objective insight— that problems are the simple consequence of insufficient knowledge—is very tempting. First, it provides a welcome excuse because nobody is responsible for the deficits in scientific knowledge. Secondly, it allows us to delegate the solution of our problems to others. The competence to establish the objective truth has been attributed to science. The reputation of science depends largely on its ability to render this service to society Of course, this image of science has always been put to doubt. There have always been, in all disciplines, individual voices calling for an ethical foundation for science. Often these ethical scientists have been criticized by the mainstream, who argue that they oppose intellectual freedom and the freedom of research and, hence, that they are against democratic thinking and might even advocate state-directed science. This would, of course, ultimately serve the interests of the ruling class—ironically making scientists with a strong ethical foundation alleged proponents of political totalitarianism. To avoid overgeneralization, it needs to be noted that “Western or “modem” science is by no means a homogeneous body There are “intellectual styles” (Gakung 1988: ) in different societies, and there have always been dissenting voices among the disciplinary mainstreams, marginal epistemological positions with greater or smaller numbers of proponents. The characteristics described above refer to the mainstream. Value freedom, purposelessness, and non-responsibility are seen as primary virtues in those very institutions that serve the self-administration of science and receive gigantic sums of money for research funding. They still provide the yardsticks for academic education and are being used to justify the privileges which scientists enjoy in our societies, especially in the rank of professors. In an article on “Western Domination in Knowledge,”1 the Sri Lankan writer Nalin de Silva (2002) addressed this problem very directly, arguing that: “Western science is supposed to be making attempts to understand the objective reality, and the truths or whatever that is taught by the westerners is said to be objectively valid. The entire European modernism that began in the fifteenth century with Renaissance, is based on objectivity, reality, and absolute truth.” Science, then, is the process of the gradual and methodologically standardized approximation of objective reality However, to be in a position to assess the degree of approximation, we should already know the objective truth. This is, in other words, a classical circular argument. Even if we assume, continues de Silva, that there is an objective reality that we can apprehend and can appropriate (“know”), even then the process of appropriation is subjective, or relative. There is no way to appropriate an objective reality objectively, ne., equally valid for all at the same time. Even the concept of objective reality is formulated subjectively (a very similar argument has been advanced by Feyerabend 1979).

### Cooperation

**No extinction from disease**

Malcolm **Gladwell**, writer for The New Yorker and best-selling author The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 19**95**, excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flue, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.